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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have seen renewed calls to revise the Constitution to 
make it more democratic. 1 We do not necessarily disagree with those who 
argue that some parts of the Constitution are flawed and should, if 
possible, be reformed. However, efforts to alter the Constitution in order 
* Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law; 
B.A., Amherst College, 1995; J.D., Yale Law School, 2001. 
** Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of 
William and Mary; A.B., Georgetown University; J.D., Vanderbilt University. Thanks 
to Svetlana Khvalina and Lindsey Kaplan for research assistance and to Mark Kende 
for asking us to participate in this Symposium. 
1. The most prominent is probably SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR 
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006). See also ROBERT DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC 
IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 2003); DANIEL LAZARE, THE FROZEN 
REPUBLIC: HOW THE CONSTITUTION IS PARALYZING DEMOCRACY (1996). 
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to make it more democratic face serious obstacles that advocates of reform 
have largely ignored. In particular, they have failed to grapple with the 
reality of widespread political ignorance, which both reduces the extent to 
which the Constitution can ever be fully democratic and makes the reform 
process more difficult. 
Part II of this Article notes that advocates of "democratizing" the 
Constitution rarely specify the theory of democratic participation to which 
they would like the Constitution to conform. This is a very significant 
omission. There is more than one theory of democratic participation, and 
different theories have widely divergent implications for constitutional 
reform. Moreover, some approaches, such as "deliberative democracy," 
imply a much higher level of political knowledge in the electorate than is 
likely to be feasible in the foreseeable future. Advocates of constitutional 
reform must specify what kind of democracy they have in mind and how it 
can be achieved given the reality of widespread citizen ignorance. 
In Part III, we provide examples of how elected officials and interest 
groups employ pro-democracy rhetoric to cloak reform proposals. 
Examples include the Twenty-Second Amendment, term limits, the 1994 
Contract with America reform proposals, voter initiatives and referenda, 
the constantly changing positions of leading political actors on the scope of 
executive power, and battles over the composition of the federal courts, 
including FDR's Court-packing plan and the recent fight over judicial 
filibusters. By highlighting the exploitation of political ignorance by elites, 
Part III suggests that substantive visions of democracy-as structured by 
ignorance- have significantly affected constitutional debates throughout 
our history. 
In Part IV, we consider the implications of political ignorance and 
substantive concerns for the actual process of constitutional change. 
Widespread ignorance is likely to reduce the quality of constitutional 
reforms that can be instituted because it might lead voters to support 
deeply flawed institutional reforms and create opportunities for 
manipulation by political elites. These dangers are heightened by the fact 
that any major constitutional changes are likely to occur as a result of a 
major political or economic crisis. Even relatively well-informed voters 
might be tempted to approve measures that promise relief from the 
immediate crisis without considering their potential long-term effects. To 
some extent, this is exactly what happened during the Great Depression. 
These dangers may be mitigated to some extent if large-scale 
constitutional change is kept within the confines of Article V of the 
Constitution. As one of us has argued elsewhere, the stringent 
2007] Can We Make the Constitution More Democratic? 973 
supermajority requirements of Article V make it difficult for political elites 
to force through constitutional change by manipulating voter ignorance.2 
However, Article V has the defects of its virtues, which include the near-
impossibility of quickly enacting any controversial amendment. As a 
result, many advocates of large-scale constitutional reform argue for a 
process that circumvents the usual Article V procedure.3 Circumventing 
Article V may be an idea whose time has come. But we must recognize an 
important weakness of circumvention: it tends to exacerbate the dangers 
posed by the combination of a crisis atmosphere and widespread political 
tgnorance. 
II. WHAT KIND OF DEMOCRACY DO WE WANT? 
Those who advocate the democratization of the Constitution rarely 
specify in any detail what kind of democracy they have in mind. Yet there 
is more than one normative theory of democratic participation, and the 
differences between them matter. Particularly important for our purposes 
are the huge differences among competing theories over the degree of 
political knowledge and deliberation required of voters. Unfortunately, 
pursuing many of these options is unrealistic in light of the deep and 
rational ignorance of most citizens. Reformers seeking to make the 
Constitution more democratic will have to specify which theory of 
democratic participation they have in mind and how they intend to address 
the challenge to its implementation posed by widespread political 
ignorance. 
A. Competing Theories of Democratic Participation 
Theories of democratic participation can be ranked on a continuum 
regarding the degree of political knowledge that they require.4 At one 
2. See llya Somin, Voter Knowledge and Constitutional Change: Assessing 
the New Deal Experience, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 595, 667-68 (2003) [hereinafter 
Somin, Voter Knowledge]. 
3. See, e.g., LAZARE, supra note 1, at 291-92 (suggesting that the House of 
Representatives might initiate constitutional reform on its own initiative); LEVINSON, 
supra note 1, at 168-77 (calling for a new constitutional convention to draft a document 
that could be approved in a national referendum); cf AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 295-99 (2005) (arguing that such an approach would be 
consistent with the Constitution); Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sovereignty and 
Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 89 (Sanford Levinson ed. , 1995) (same). 
4. For a more detailed analysis of major theories of political participation 
and representation, see Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian 
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extreme are advocates of deliberative democracy, who want voters to not 
only understand specific policy issues but also be able to deliberate about 
them in a sophisticated manner.5 In some versions of the theory, citizens 
are expected to accept complex restrictions on modes of deliberation of a 
sort that are normally the province of professional political philosophers. 
For example, some leading advocates of deliberative democracy claim that 
the deliberative process must be limited to arguments based on 
"impartiality" between citizens and incorporating the "mutual recognition 
of competent subjects."6 Others contend that citizens should only be 
allowed to "appeal to reasons that are recognizably moral in form and 
mutually acceptable in content" and only make empirical claims backed by 
reliable scientific evidence.7 
At the other end of the spectrum lies Joseph Schumpeter's 
minimalistic approach, which only requires that voters be able to 
periodically remove incumbents they dislike.8 So long as voters have even 
minimal knowledge and understanding, they can still punish incumbents 
for egregiously poor performance or for flagrant deviations from majority 
opinion.9 
In between these two extremes lie several other approaches that 
require varying degrees of voter sophistication. For example, the theory of 
retrospective voting is a relatively modest extension of the Schumpeterian 
approach, requiring voters to assess incumbents on the basis of their 
Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 
IOWA L. REv. 1287, 1296-1304 (2004) [hereinafter Somin, Political Ignorance]. 
5. For recent defenses of deliberative democracy, see AMY GUTMANN & 
DENNIS F. THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004); ETHAN J. LEIB, 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (2004). For citations to other literature in 
this area, see Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL REv. 
413, 438-42 (1998) [hereinafter Somin, Voter Ignorance); Somin, Political Ignorance, 
supra note 4, at 1303-06. 
6. JDRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE 
ACTION 75-76, 100 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., MIT Press 
1990) (1983). 
7. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISAGREEMENT 57-58 (1996). 
8. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 272 
(3d ed. 1950). 
9. For a modern endorsement and elaboration of Schumpeter's theory, see 
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 14-19 (2003) ; for a 
critique, see llya Somin, Richard Posner's Democratic Pragmatism, 16 CRITICAL REv. 
1, 17-18 (2004). See also Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy: Reply 
to Somin, 16 CRITICAL REV. 465 (2004); Ilya Somin, Pragmatism, Democracy, and 
Judicial Review: Rejoinder to Posner, 16 CRITICAL REv. 473 (2004). 
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records in office and "punish" them at the polls if those records seem 
poor. 10 However, retrospective voting may still impose a substantial 
information burden on voters if they are to be able to accurately assess the 
quality of incumbents' policies. They need to know which officials are 
responsible for which issues, and also be able to tell how well the issue in 
question is being handled. 11 
A comparable, but perhaps greater, knowledge burden is imposed by 
theories of democracy that require voters to assess specific policy issues 
and exercise meaningful choice over the options available to them. This is 
the model embraced by numerous political scientists.12 It is also probably 
the one that most laypeople have in mind when speaking of democratic 
control of government. 
Finally, there are a variety of other theories of participation, not all of 
which can be considered in detail here. Perhaps the best known is that of 
"Burkean trusteeship," which requires that voters judge not the merits of 
competing policies, but those of competing candidates.13 Edmund Burke, 
the eighteenth century British statesman who played a key role in 
developing the theory, claimed that voters should choose representatives of 
superior judgment and virtue-a "natural aristocracy" -and then give 
them broad discretion to make policy.14 Explicitly factoring voter 
ignorance into his theory, Burke argued that this is the best approach 
because most ordinary citizens lack sufficient sophistication to "think or act 
without direction."15 However, even Burkean trusteeship places a 
10. See Somin, Political Ignorance, supra note 4, at 1298-1300. 
11. See id. at 1300. 
12. See, e.g., ROBERTS. ERIKSON ET AL., STATEHOUSE DEMOCRACY: PUBLIC 
OPINION AND POLICY IN THE AMERICAN STATES (1993) (measuring political 
responsiveness of state governments by their adherence to popular preferences on 
specific issues); LAWRENCE R. JACOBS, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: PUBLIC OPINION 
AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH HEALTH POLICY (1993) (measuring 
popular control of health policy in the same way); LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & ROBERTY. 
SHAPIRO, POLITICIANS DON'T PANDER: POLITICAL MANIPULATION AND THE LOSS OF 
DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS (2000) (criticizing political leaders for failing to follow 
centrist public opinion on important issues). For an assessment of some of this 
literature, see Ilya Somin, Do Politicians Pander?, 14 CRITICAL REV. 147 (2001) 
(reviewing JACOBS & SHAPIRO, supra). 
13. See Somin, Political Ignorance, supra note 4, at 1300-02. 
14. EDMUND BURKE, BURKE'S POLITICS 397-98 (Ross J.S. Hoffman & Paul 
Levack eds., Alfred A. Knopf 1949). For an analysis of the Burkean trusteeship 
theory, see HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 168-89 
(1967). 
15. BURKE, supra note 14, at 398. This brief summary deliberately ignores 
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substantial information burden on voters because it requires them to be 
able to judge the qualifications and virtue of competing candidates.16 
Finally, there are more radical theories of direct democracy, which 
would require hands-on voter participation in everyday governanceY This 
approach is, of course, similar to the direct democracy of ancient Athens. 
It raises many of the same issues of voter competence as were debated in 
the ancient world.'s 
B. The Shadow of Rational Political Ignorance 
Any attempt to reform the Constitution in order to better 
approximate one's preferred theory of democratic participation must 
contend with the specter of widespread political ignorance. That ignorance 
is longstanding and is not primarily the result of intelligence or poor 
education. 
Decades of survey research has established that most citizens have 
only minimal knowledge of politics and public policy.19 Surveys conducted 
around the time of the closely contested 2004 presidential election showed 
that seventy percent of the public was unaware that the Bush 
Administration's prescription drug plan had been adopted-even though it 
was the largest and most expensive new domestic program in decades.20 
many internal contradictions and qualifications in Burke's own views because our 
interest is not in Burke per se, but in the knowledge requirements of the trusteeship 
theory of representation more generally. For a more nuanced analysis of Burke's 
theory of trusteeship representation, see PITKIN, supra note 14, at 127-31, 168-89. 
16. See Somin, Political Ignorance, supra note 4, at 1300-02. 
17. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 117-38 (1984). 
18. See JENNIFER TOLBERT ROBERTS, ATHENS . ON TRIAL: THE 
ANTIDEMOCRATIC TRADITION IN WESTERN THOUGHT 25-92 (1994) (discussing ancient 
critiques of Athenian democracy, which, critics asserted, allowed ignorant and 
incompetent voters to be in control of public policy). 
19. For citations to the literature and additional data, see Somin, Political 
Ignorance, supra note 4, at 1304-15. See also SCOTT L. ALTHAUS, COLLECTIVE 
PREFERENCES IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS: OPINION SURVEYS AND THE WILL OF THE 
PEOPLE (2003) (examining voter knowledge of issues and events and how it relates to 
broader public opinion); BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER (2007) 
(reporting on over forty years of American political knowledge); MICHAEL X. DELLI 
CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT 
MATTERS (1996) (documenting widespread voter ignorance and explaining the 
importance of political knowledge to the democratic process). 
20. Ilya Somin, When Ignorance Isn't Bliss: How Political Ignorance 
Threatens Democracy, CATO INST. POL'Y ANALYSIS, Sept. 22, 2004, at 4, 5-6 
[hereinafter Somin, Ignorance Isn't Bliss]. 
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Fifty-eight percent admitted that they had heard "'very little'" or 
"'nothing"' about the controversial Patriot Act.21 Perhaps more telling, 
while only twenty-five percent of Americans can name more than one of 
the five First Amendment freedoms, more than fifty percent can name at 
least two members of the Simpsons cartoon family. 22 
Such widespread ignorance is not primarily the result of irrationality 
or intelligence. Since the 1950s, many scholars have recognized that voters 
are "rationally ignorant" about politics. 23 Because of the insignificance of 
any single vote, even voters who make the tremendous effort to become 
highly informed have almost no chance to swing the electoral outcome in 
favor of the better candidate or party.24 The acquisition of political 
information is a classic collective action problem, a situation in which a 
valuable product-in this case, information-is undersupplied because any 
one individual's possible contribution to its production is insignificant. 
Those who choose not to contribute will still get to enjoy the benefits of the 
good if it is successfully provided through the efforts of others.25 
Obviously, some voters acquire political knowledge for reasons unrelated 
to casting a better ballot-such as the possible entertainment value of 
politics. However, the evidence suggests that few acquire it in order to 
become better voters.26 
In addition to acquiring relatively little knowledge about politics, 
rationally ignorant voters also have poor incentives to make good use of 
the information they do possess. They may limit not only the amount of 
information they acquire but also "how rationally they process the 
information they do have."27 Rational ignorance is exacerbated by 
21. /d. 
22. Aye, Carumba! U.S. Fails History, NEWSDA Y, Mar. 2, 2006, at A15. 
23. For the pioneering early work on this subject, see ANTHONY DOWNS, AN 
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238-76 (1957). 
24. See William H. Riker & Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of 
Voting, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 25 (1968) (showing the miniscule probability that one 
vote could actually determine the outcome of a national election). 
25. For the classic general discussion of collective action theory, see MANCUR 
OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). See generally RUSSELL 
HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982) (extending Olson's argument with various 
applications to political participation). 
26. Even well-informed Americans may know very little about specific policy 
questions so much so that general knowledge about politics is not especially useful in 
sorting out one's views on specific policy questions. See Martin Gilens, Political 
Ignorance and Collective Policy Preferences, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 379 (2001). 
27. Bryan Caplan, Rational Ignorance vs. Rational Irrationality, 54 KYKLOS 3, 
5 (2001); see also CAPLAN, supra note 19, at 11~1 (explicating and defending the 
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"rational irrationality. "28 
As one of us has argued in greater detail elsewhere, the fact that 
there is so little incentive for citizens to acquire political information in 
order to be a better voter implies that most of the political information we 
do acquire is in fact sought out for other reasons.29 In particular, those who 
acquire political knowledge may do so because they are committed 
partisans of a particular party or ideology. Like sports fans, they follow 
politics primarily for the purpose of cheering on their team rather than 
seeking out the truth.30 Other non-electoral motives for following politics 
may include the desire for entertainment, which could explain tremendous 
popular interest in political leaders' sex scandals and other human interest 
stories. Such events have great entertainment value, despite having little 
impact on policy.3I 
Many of these motivations may undercut the goal of rational 
assessment of candidates and policy proposals. Research shows that voters 
often do a poor job of assessing political information. For example, they 
tend to discount evidence that cuts against their preexisting views while 
overvaluing data that reinforces them.32 Even experts on public policy 
suffer from these and other biases in their evaluations of political 
information.33 Such mistakes are a natural consequence of acquiring 
political information for reasons other than the desire to cast a "better" 
vote. For this reason, "rational irrationality" stands as a major road block 
to rational democratic assessment of public policy. 
Voters who possess little political knowledge can sometimes use 
information shortcuts to offset their ignorance. Possible shortcuts include: 
cues from respected opinion leaders,34 knowledge about political parties,35 
theory of the "rational irrationality" of voters in greater detail). 
28. CAPLAN, supra note 19, at 114-41. 
29. Ilya Somin, Knowledge About Ignorance: New Directions in the Study of 
Political Information, 18 CRITICAL REV. 255, 260-62 (2006) [hereinafter Somin, 
Knowledge About Ignorance]. 
30. /d. at 260-61. 
31. For example, the most widely known facts about President George H.W. 
Bush were his distaste for broccoli and that he had a dog named Millie. DELLI 
CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 19, at 101. 
32. See Somin, Knowledge About Ignorance, supra note 29, at 261 
(summarizing this point and citing relevant studies). 
33. See generally PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT (2005). 
34. See, e.g., Philip E. Converse, Popular Representation and the Distribution 
of Information, in INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 369 (John A. Ferejohn 
& James H. Kuklinski eds., 1990). 
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and politically relevant information from everyday life.36 
No doubt, rational ignorance is partially mitigated by the availability 
of shortcuts. But shortcuts have significant limitations as substitutes for 
actual political knowledge.37 For example, effective reliance on opinion 
leaders requires that voters have enough knowledge to do a good job 
choosing which leaders to follow.38 Even worse, the problem of rational 
irrationality implies that voters may systematically choose poor 
information shortcuts rather than good ones, if the former cater to their 
desire for entertainment or reinforcement of pre-existing prejudices.39 A 
major recent study by economist Bryan Caplan shows that information 
shortcuts have apparently not prevented the majority of citizens from 
making major systematic mistakes in their evaluations of economic policy.40 
Shortcuts can sometimes partially alleviate the problem of rational 
ignorance. But they are not a complete solution for it, and may in some 
cases make the situation even worse. 
The combination of rational ignorance and rational irrationality poses 
an important challenge for would-be constitutional reformers, particularly 
if they embrace a theory of democratic participation that requires 
significant voter knowledge and sophistication. 
35. See, e.g., JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND 
TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 47-49, 170-74 (1995); V.O. 
KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 298-311 (1949); Morris P. 
Fiorina, An Outline for a Model of Party Choice, 21 AM. J. POL. SCI. 601 (1977); 
DOWNS, supra note 23, at 96-141. 
36. For the leading advocate of the efficacy of this shortcut, see SAMUEL L. 
POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER (1991) and Samuel L. Popkin, Information Shortcuts 
and the Reasoning Voter, in INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION, AND CHOICE 17 (Bernard 
Grofman ed., 1993). See also DONALD A. WITTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC 
FAILURE 1-6 (1995). Examples of politically relevant information from everyday life 
may include experience serving in the military (which could provide insight into policy 
decisions related to war), experience of being unemployed (which may help the citizen 
understand some aspects of economic policy), or experience of inflation (which alerts 
the citizen to the possibility that inflation is rising and has therefore become a more 
serious public policy problem). 
37. Somin, Ignorance Isn't Bliss, supra note 20, at 5; Somin, Voter Ignorance, 
supra note 5, at 419-31. 
38. Ilya Somin, Resolving the Democratic Dilemma?, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 
410-11 (1999) (reviewing ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE 
DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 
(1998)); see infra Part III (highlighting ways that elected officials and interest groups 
often seek to conceal true purpose of reform proposals). 
39. Somin, Knowledge About Ignorance, supra note 29, at 262-65. 
40. CAPLAN, supra note 19, at 50-93. 
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C. Implications for Constitutional Reform 
If we are to make progress in the debate over constitutional reform, 
those who advocate changing the Constitution to make it more democratic 
must specify which theory of democratic participation they have in mind. 
Different theories may imply very different changes to the constitutional 
structure. 
For example, deliberative democracy-if feasible at all-likely 
requires a major effort to increase voter knowledge and understanding of 
public policy. Retrospective voting, by contrast, may require making it 
easier for voters to trace particular policies to specific officeholders. This 
might increase a voters' ability to identify politicians who deserve credit or 
blame for particular policy outcomes. 
The relatively minimalistic Schumpeterian approach probably 
requires less radical changes than the other models. However, if we are 
truly committed to the idea that voters should be able to remove 
incumbent policymakers if they are dissatisfied with them, we may wish to 
do away with life-tenured judges, the Federal Reserve and other 
institutions in which key policymakers are insulated from punishment at 
the ballot box. Moreover, even the Shumpeterian model has knowledge 
prerequisites that the majority of citizens often fail to meet. 41 
We can easily imagine numerous other implications of the various 
theories of political participation for particular reform proposals. Here, it 
is important to stress the more general point that we cannot make the 
Constitution more democratic without knowing what kind of democracy 
we have in mind and how that form of democracy can be achieved in the 
face of widespread ignorance. 
In addition to explaining which theory of democratic participation 
they seek to implement, constitutional reformers must also show how they 
intend to cope with the problem of widespread rational ignorance. Some 
theories of participation require vastly greater knowledge about politics 
than most citizens currently possess. This is particularly true in the case of 
deliberative democracy, which imposes a very steep information burden on 
voters.42 But even more modest theories, such as retrospective voting and 
Burkean trusteeship, have information prerequisites that the majority of 
citizens often fail to meet.43 If constitutional reform is to provide genuine 
41. See Somin, Political Ignorance, supra note 4, at 1315-16. 
42. See Somin, Voter Ignorance, supra note 5, at 438-42. 
43. See Somin, Political Ignorance, supra note 4, at 1298-1302. 
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increases in democratic participation, advocates must explain how their 
proposal will either increase voter knowledge or facilitate democracy even 
in spite of widespread political ignorance.44 
Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin have put forth a proposal to try 
to circumvent the political ignorance that otherwise blocks implementation 
of deliberative democracy.45 They contend that political ignorance can be 
alleviated by requiring voters to spend a day deliberating on public policy 
issues prior to each presidential election.46 We are skeptical that a single 
day of discussion can do much to alleviate massive ignorance-much less 
alleviate rational irrationality. Nonetheless, Ackerman and Fishkin are 
right to focus on the problem of ignorance and to look for a possible 
solution. Unfortunately, most of the debate over constitutional reform has 
proceeded without consideration of the problem of ignorance. That 
neglect should be remedied. 
III. THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF PRO-DEMOCRACY REFORMS 
Elected officials and interest groups often mask their pursuit of 
substantive policy goals when advancing structural reform proposals. 
Seeking to capitalize on widespread voter ignorance, reform proposals are 
packaged in ways calculated to garner public support, shifting the emphasis 
away from contested policy outcomes and toward good government 
reforms. This Part provides some examples of this practice. In doing so, 
we do not mean to suggest that all proponents of structural reform are 
untrustworthy, seeking to cloak their true agenda from votersY Our point, 
44. We do not doubt that structural changes intended to make the 
Constitution more democratic will create incentives for voters to pay more attention to 
policymaking. Nevertheless, rational ignorance and rational irrationality are tied to the 
fact that a single vote is unlikely to make a difference in shaping public policy, and 
proposals intended to make the Constitution more democratic will not change that 
reality. For similar reasons, one of us has argued that proposals to take the 
Constitution from the Court by eliminating judicial review would not create sufficient 
incentives for lawmakers, interest groups, and the American people to pay greater 
attention to constitutional questions. Neal Devins, Commentary, Reanimator: Mark 
Tushnet and the Second Coming of the Imperial Presidency, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 359, 
365-67 (2000); see also Joan L. Larsen, Constitutionalism Without Courts?, 94 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 983, 990-92 (2000) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION 
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) and arguing for retention of judicial review in light of 
the relative economic, legal, and social costs associated with removal). 
45. BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004). 
46. !d. at 17-39. 
47. For example, we think that Sandy Levinson and many other academic 
proponents of structural reform are motivated by a desire to make our government 
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instead, is that there is a mismatch between the public debate over 
structural reform proposals and the true purpose of these reforms-a 
mismatch that is fueled by political ignorance. 
A disjunction between the public justification and rhetoric of 
constitutional reform is not in and of itself harmful. As basic economics 
shows us, firms seeking profit for themselves can simultaneously benefit 
consumers. Profit-seeking entrepreneurs have incentives to create 
products with lower prices and higher quality than those of their 
competitors, thereby improviitg consumer welfare. However, there is no 
comparable, necessary connection between institutional reforms motivated 
by substantive policy agendas and increases in democracy, however the 
latter is defined. Thus, there is a real danger that constitutional reforms 
packaged as democracy-enhancipg will have no such effect. 
Before turning to examples of proposals to alter the federal structure, 
we set the stage for this Part by discussing state voter initiatives and 
referenda. A majority of states, especially in the West and South, allow 
voters to shape constitutional values by placing legislative and 
constitutional reform on the ballot. Supporters of this practice extol its 
democratic virtues, namely that initiative and referenda encourage voters 
to be more engaged in policymaking and that direct democracy is a more 
accurate measure of voter preferences than the laws and regulations 
produced by elected officials.48 Proponents of initiatives and referenda 
likewise argue that special interest politics play a smaller role in direct 
democracy campaigns than they do in the state legislative process.49 
But the promise and reality of direct democracy are two very 
different things.50 There · is good reason to think that interest groups also 
more democratic. 
48. See HARLAN HAHN & SHELDON KAMIENIECKI, REFERENDUM VOTING: 
SOCIAL STATUS AND POLICY PREFERENCES 16-19 (1987); DAVID B. MAGLEBY, 
DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 25 
(1984). 
49. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF 
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 10--11 (1989). 
50. This is not to deny that some initiative campaigns reflect popular 
sentiment more accurately than the state legislative process. For example, property 
rights reform in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's Keto decision has been much 
more meaningful when pursued by citizen initiative than when pursued by the 
legislative process, where lawmakers in many states have capitalized on voter 
ignorance to push reforms that give the appearance of change while actually 
accomplishing very little. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the 
Political Response to Kelo (Mar. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
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have a strong influence over referenda, just as they do over ordinary 
legislation.51 For example, interest groups often sponsor initiative and 
referenda campaigns with national groups writing ballot initiatives, 
collecting signatures, and launching public relations campaigns to secure 
the enactment of their favored policies.52 Similarly, they sometimes 
organize to defeat a popular initiative by advancing competing initiative 
proposals that are intended to confuse voters (so voters will maintain the 
status quo by defeating the popular initiative).53 More generally, voters-
by a six to one majority in a 1990 California_ poll-question their ability to 
"make an intelligent choice" when casting their ballots.54 And if that is not 
enough, initiative sponsors often sell measures that voters disapprove of by 
packaging them with measures that voters support-for example, limits on 
the contractual rights of same-sex couples (which the majority of voters 
may oppose) are bundled with generally popular prohibitions of same-sex 
marriage. 55 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=976298: 
51. See Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 17 (1997); Thad Kousser & Matthew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, 
Crypto-Initiatives, and Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 949 
(2005). 
52. See RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE 
PROCESS IN AMERICA 102-09 (2002); Garrett, supra note 51, at 19; HAHN & 
KAMIENCKI, supra note 48, at 20. More than that, interest groups sometimes take over 
populist initiatives by using their deep pockets to see to it that their own interests were 
served in the initiative campaign. See, e.g., DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY 
DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF MONEY 154 (2000). At the 
same time, initiative opponents sometimes mischaracterize the role of special interests. 
For example, when Colorado passed an anti-gay rights initiative, initiative opponents 
miscast "the proponents of Amendment 2 as a loose conspiracy of national 
organizations-a web of right-wingers and religious fanatics with a far-reaching 
agenda." Robert F. Nagel, Playing Defense, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 167, 171 
(1997). 
53. See, e.g., John Garamendi, California's Ballot Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 
7, 1990, at A15 (discussing the insurance industry's sponsoring of "initiatives designed 
to neutralize consumer-sponsored initiatives on the same ballot"). Special interests, 
moreover, launch television campaigns to defeat initiatives they dislike. See, e.g., Evan 
Halper, Tobacco Firms Light Up Airwaves, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006, at B1 (discussing 
tobacco interests' efforts to characterize an initiative on cigarette taxes "as a ploy by 
bottom line-driven hospitals and HMOs to boost profits"). 
54. See George Skelton, Voters Say Initiatives are Out of Control, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 1990, at Al. 
55. See Kurt G. Kastorf, Comment, Logrolling Gets Lagro/led: Same-Sex 
Marriage, Direct Democracy, and the Single Subject Rule, 54 EMORY L.J. 1633, 1633 
(2005); Thomas Oliphant, The Gay Marriage Deception, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 2004, 
at 011. 
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Direct democracy is revealing for another reason- one that is central 
to the other examples in this Part. The inclusion of voter initiative and 
referenda provisions in state constitutions is largely tied to progressive 
efforts to pursue "social reforms of regulating industry, creating 
progressive taxation, and enacting programs to combat poverty."56 In other 
words, direct democracy was seen as a mechanism to advance a particular 
substantive policy agenda, not as a mechanism to empower citizens to 
shape policy outcomes through democratic discourse. The other examples 
highlighted in this Part follow a similar script-that is, federal structural 
reform proposals are not pursued as ends in themselves. Instead, 
proponents of structural reform invariably are pursuing some substantive 
policy agenda. 
Consider, for example, various proposals to change the composition 
of the Supreme Court and the process by which federal judges are 
confirmed by the Senate. When President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
introduced his Court-packing plan, he did not mention his frustration with 
Supreme Court decisions limiting New Deal initiativesY Instead, 
Roosevelt emphasized the problem of "aged or infirm judges" and claimed 
that super-annuated Justices lacked the "mental or physical vigor" to 
examine "complicated and changed conditions. "58 In other words, the 
Supreme Court needed new, younger blood to function effectively. This 
claim was quickly rebuffed by Chief Justice Hughes, who wrote to the 
Senate that "apart from any question of policy" an increase in the number 
of Justices "would not promote the efficiency of the Court."59 For his part, 
Roosevelt was eventually forced to admit the true purposes of his plan, 
namely that the Court was standing in the way of the "modern movement 
for social and economic progress through legislation. "60 
56. Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why 
the Initiative, Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & 
POL'Y REV. 11, 23 (1997). 
57. For an excellent treatment of the subject, see WILLIAM E. 
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995). For FDR's strategy in the Court-
packing battle see also Somin, Voter Knowledge, supra note 2, at 659-61. 
58. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, The President 
Presents a Plan for the Reorganization of the Judicial Branch of the Government (Feb. 
5, 1937), in 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 53-55 
(Russell & Russell1969) (1941). 
59. S. REP No. 711, 75-711, at 40 (1937). 
60. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, A "Fireside Chat" 
Discussing the Plan for Reorganization of the Judiciary (Mar. 9, 1937), in 6 THE 
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 125 (Russell & Russell 
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Recent skirmishes over judicial appointments are cut from a similar 
cloth. The most striking example is the flip-flopping rhetoric of Democrats 
and Republicans over filibusters. During the George W. Bush presidency, 
Republicans condemned the filibuster as anti-democratic. Demanding that 
judicial nominees be allowed an up-or-down vote, Republicans threatened 
to amend Senate rules to do away with filibusters of judicial nominees.61 
For their part, Democrats defended the filibuster as a pro-democracy 
measure; then House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi demonstrates: "We 
will not let them undermine one of the tenets of democracy: the rights of 
the minority. "62 
When Bill Clinton was President, however, both Democrats and 
Republicans sang much different songs. Democrats decried Republican 
abuses of the filibuster, threatening to adjourn the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in retaliation for Republican refusals to allow votes on Clinton 
nominees.63 Republicans, in contrast, defended the filibuster and other 
delaying strategies.64 
The fact that Democrats opposed Bush nominees on ideological 
grounds and Republicans opposed Clinton nominees for similar ideological 
reasons was downplayed in these filibuster fights. The reason: lawmakers 
thought neutral sounding rhetoric about democratic values and potential 
abuses of power were a better way to advance their partisan objectives than 
an outright defense of their practices on ideological grounds. Indeed, focus 
group interviews conducted by Democratic strategists in 2005 revealed that 
voters would not embrace a partisan attack on Bush's judicial nominees; in 
contrast, voters did think it was wrong for Republicans to "chang[e] the 
rules in the middle of the game" and do away with the filibuster in order to 
force up or down votes on Bush's judicial selections.65 A knowledgeable 
1969) (1941). 
61. See 149 CONG. REc. S14528 (daily ed. Nov. 12. 2003) (statement of Sen. 
Frist). 
62. Carolyn Lochhead, Senate Hearings Halted in Hint of Battle to Come, S.F. 
CHRONICLE, May 19, 2005, at Al. 
63. See Lloyd Cutler, The Way to Kill Senate Rule XXII, WASH. POST, Apr. 
19, 1993, at A23 (condemning Republican use of filibusters in blocking legislation 
backed by President Clinton). 
64. For a general defense of the filibuster (both with respect to judicial 
nominees and legislation), see 139 CONG. REC. S5719 (daily ed. May 7, 1993) 
(statement of Sen. Dole). 
65. Matt Bai, The Framing Wars, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 17, 2005, at 38, 41. 
Interest groups opposed to the 1987 Robert Bork Supreme Court nomination likewise 
made use of focus groups to sort out how best to frame their message. In particular, 
after learning that the abortion issue would not work with most voters, pro-choice 
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and attentive electorate would likely see through such transparent 
strategies. Not so a rationally ignorant electorate in which many voters can 
be easily influenced by misleading rhetorics. 
That Republicans and Democrats alter their positions on filibusters 
whenever there is a change of party in the White House underscores the 
fact that ideology, not views about democracy, defines lawmaker attitudes 
on the appropriate and inappropriate uses of the filibuster. Moreover, the 
strategic use of pro-democracy rhetoric makes clear that lawmakers do not 
see reform proposals as a way of engaging the American people in 
constitutional or policy discourse; instead, lawmakers and interest groups 
are interested in advancing a substantive agenda, and the rhetoric of 
democracy is simply a tool that allows partisans to advance their 
positions. 66 
Congressional positions on separation of powers issues follow a 
nearly identical script: Republican and Democratic attitudes toward 
presidential power vary depending on who sits in the White House. When 
Bill Clinton was President, Republicans viewed congressional oversight of 
the Executive branch as integral to a well functioning democracy. 
Reflecting the view that power should not be centralized in a too powerful 
president, Republican Jim Leach said in 1994 that it was "'indefensible that 
a [Democratically controlled] Congress charged with oversight lacks the 
backbone to investigate the executive branch, even if it may be 
embarrassing to their party's President. " '67 For their part, Democrats 
interest groups and Democratic Senators shifted their message away from abortion and 
to a broader attack on privacy. MARK GITENSTEIN, MAITERS OF PRINCIPLE 112-17 
(1992). In one full page newspaper ad, anti-Bork interests claimed that "[y]our 
personal privacy . . . has never been in greater danger," including "your freedom to 
make your own decisions about marriage and family, childbearing and parenting." 
Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1987, at A9 
(Advertisement). The fact that lawmakers were unlikely to enact politically unpopular 
restrictions on marriage, parenting, and the like did not matter. What mattered was 
that the abortion issue would not play and, as such, a bit of misdirection was needed. 
66. Much the same can be said of recent efforts of Democratic Senators to 
insist that Supreme Court nominees be in the "judicial mainstream" and that the Court 
be ideologically diverse. For example, rather than simply say that he opposed Bush 
Supreme Court nominees Roberts and Alito on ideological grounds, Senator Charles 
Schumer said that: "a Supreme Court with one Scalia and one Brennan would be a 
vibrant and interesting Court; but five of either would be utterly imbalanced." 
Nomination of John G. Roberts to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1287 (2005) (statement of Sen. Charles 
Schumer, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
67. Keith Bradsher, House Inquiry Is Urged on Clintons' Land Deals, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1994, at A16. 
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accused Republicans (after their 1994 takeover of Congress) of "misusing 
Congressional oversight powers to harass and intimidate the 
Administration."68 But when Democrats took over Congress in 2006, at a 
time when the presidency was controlled by the Republicans, oversight was 
considered a necessary part of our system of checks and balances. 
Complaining that "up until now the Republican Congress has given 
[President George W. Bush] a blank check with no oversight, no standards, 
no conditions,"69 Democrats made oversight reform a top priority. 
Democrats accused Congressional Republicans of "having abdicated their 
responsibility for oversight. "70 Indeed, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton 
blamed much of "the Iraq crisis on a 'Congress [that] was supine under the 
Republican majority, failing to conduct oversight and [demand] 
accountability.' "71 
Lawmaker attitudes toward the federal-state balance are likewise tied 
to the substantive agendas of Democrats and Republicans. In particular, 
there is no federalism constituency as such in Congress. Lawmakers and 
interest groups regularly trade off federalism in order to pursue first order 
policy priorities.n This was true when Jeffersonians and Federalists flipped 
their normal positions in a fight over the Louisiana Purchase.73 And it is 
true today-when Republicans eschewed and Democrats embraced states' 
rights in the Terri Schiavo case, in which the Republican Congress enacted 
legislation calling upon federal courts to reconsider a state court order 
terminating Ms. Schiavo's life support.74 Against this backdrop, it is not 
68. Jerry Gray, G.O.P. Accuses Administration of Political Improprieties, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1995, at A10. Republicans defended their increasing oversight of 
federal agencies. See Ellen Messmer & David Rhode, Republicans Promise New 
Outlook on Telecom Reform, NETWORK WORLD, Nov. 14, 1994. 
69. Michael R. Gordon & Jeff Zeleny, Latest Plan Sets a Series of Goals for 
Iraq Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2007, at A1 (quoting House Majority Leader Nancy 
Pelosi) . 
70. Philip Shenon, As New 'Cop on the Beat,' Congressman Starts Patrol, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at A18. 
71. David S. Broder, Clinton's Presidential Posturing, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 
2007, at B7. 
72. See Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 Nw. U. L. 
REv. 131 (2004) [hereinafter Devins, Judicial Safeguards]; John 0 . McGinnis & llya 
Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 
99 Nw. U. L. REV. 89 (2004). 
73. Jeffersonians, who had consistently advocated for states' rights backed the 
Louisiana Purchase; Federalists, making use of states' rights arguments, opposed it. 
FORREST MCDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION 58-62 (2000). 
74. See Neal Devins, Tom DeLay: Popular Constitutionalist? , 81 CHI. KENT 
L. REV. 1055, 1062-67 (2006) (discussing the political battle over Terri Schiavo and the 
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surpnsmg that pro-federalism reform proposals are much more about 
substantive policy objectives than the pro-democracy rhetoric of the 
federal-state balance. 
Consider, for example, the 1994 Republican Contract with America. 
Like many pro-federalism reform proposals, the Contract was couched in 
pro-democracy ideals- a promise "to restore the bonds of trust between 
the people and their elected representatives."75 Among other things, the 
Contract embraced the idea that states and localities are closer to the 
people than the federal government and, consequently, decentralized 
federalism is a better mechanism to satisfy voter preferences than a unitary 
federal policy.76 By turning grants for hundreds of domestic programs into 
a few block grants, Republicans argued that state governments would 
benefit from fewer strings attached to the money and greater flexibility in 
how they chose to spend the money.77 Republicans also promised to 
"curb[] the congressional propensity to create new programs and make 
states pay for them" and bring an end to unfunded mandates.78 
A closer look at what the Republican Congress did and did not 
pursue, however, suggests that lawmakers were far more interested in 
advancing first-order policy preferences than in making the government 
more responsive to voter preferences. Block grants were pursued in an 
effort to scale back programs that the new Republican majority 
disfavored.79 Most significantly, the new Congress pursued welfare reform, 
abolishing more than a hundred social programs and replacing them with 
block grants that would reduce federal government spending by as much as 
possible underlying impetuses). 
75. Republican Members of the House of Representatives, Republican 
Contract with America, http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2007). 
76. See Richard L. Berke, Dole and Gingrich Embrace Before Republican 
Governors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1994, at A18; Associated Press, Mandate Limit OKd 
in Senate: Bill Would Make U.S. Help State Pay Way, CHI. TRIB., Jan 28, 1995, at 3 
(quoting Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole describing federalism as "[t]he idea that 
power should be kept close to people"). 
77. Robert Pear, G.O.P. is Detailing Broad Proposals to Trim Welfare, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at Al. 
78. Associated Press, supra note 76, at 3. 
79. For a discussion of how the Reagan Administration employed the rhetoric 
of federalism while pushing its substantive policy agenda through block grant 
programs, see Neal Devins & James B. Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The 
Meaning of the Chicago School Desegregation Cases, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1243 
(1984). 
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twenty percent in food, job training, child care, and foster care.80 And 
while welfare and other block grant reforms allowed states significant 
power to re-fashion existing programs, Republicans in Congress 
nevertheless sought to further favored policies by placing conditions on the 
states.81 
Unfunded mandate reforms were largely symbolic because 
Republicans and Democrats were both willing to impose unfunded 
mandates on the states in order to pursue favored policies.sz Consequently, 
even though Congress enacted legislation disapproving of unfunded 
mandates, Congress did not place meaningful limits on its power to impose 
unfunded mandates.83 For similar reasons, Republicans in Congress did 
not pursue another plank of their Contract with America- term limits. 
Term limit reforms were intended to make members of Congress 
more accountable to the people who elect them and to reduce the size of 
the federal government, under the view that career politicians lose touch 
with their constituents and, instead, shift their allegiances to inside-the-
Beltway special interests. In reality, "[t]he term-limits movement was 
originally inspired by conservatives, who thought the only way to unseat 
the long-entrenched Democrats would be through a constitutional 
amendment to limit their terms."84 When Republicans took over the House 
in 1994, a vote on term limits was put off for lack of support and 
80. Jason DeParle, House G.O.P. Would Replace Scores of Programs for the 
Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1994, at Al. For an extensive examination of how welfare 
block grants furthered the substantive agenda of many Republicans, see DEMETRA 
SMITH NIGHTINGALE ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, THE STATUS OF THE WELFARE-
TO-WORK (WTW) GRANT PROGRAM AFTER ONE YEAR (1999), 
http://www.urban.org/U ploadedPDF/wtw _labor.pdf. 
81. Conservative Republicans wanted to regulate the use of federal money to 
reduce out-of-wedlock births and penalize welfare recipients who refuse to work. 
Robert Pear, Republicans' Philosophical Discord Stalls Plan for Changes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 12, 1995, at A20. Other examples of Republican efforts to condition block grants 
include reducing block grants in the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Boren 
Amendment to Medicaid. See Daniel H. Cole & Carol S. Comer, Rhetoric, Reality, 
and the Law of Unfunded Federal Mandates, STAN. L. & POL'Y REV., Summer 1997, at 
103, 114. 
82. See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 72, at 106-07 (explaining why 
Congress has incentives to pursue favored programs and not to pursue a pro-federalism 
agenda that would curtail federal power). 
83. See Louis Fisher, The 'Contract with America': What It Really Means, 
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, June 22, 1995, at 20. 
84. Katharine Q . Seelye, Term-Limit Gamble, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1995, at 
A26. 
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Republicans, more generally, downplayed the need to limit their terms.85 
By 1998, several Republicans backed away from their pledge to serve no 
more than three terms in Congress.86 
The rise and fall of term limit reforms exemplifies several points 
made throughout this Part: the propensity of politicians to curry favor with 
voters by claiming to be pursuing good governmental reforms when, in fact, 
they are pursuing their partisan agendas; the unwillingness of politicians to 
truly embrace democracy-enhancing reforms that might limit either their 
power or their substantive agendas; and the willingness of lawmakers to 
flip their positions on structural questions whenever there is a change in 
party leadership in either Congress or the White House. Such maneuvers 
feed on the reality of widespread political ignorance, which makes it easier 
for political leaders to cloak their substantive agendas in misleading 
rhetorics emphasizing process value. 
One final example is the Twenty-Second Amendment: approved by 
Congress in 1947 and ratified by the states in 1951, the Twenty-Second 
Amendment limits a president to two terms in office.87 The fight over the 
amendment largely broke down along party lines, with Republicans 
uniformly supporting the measure and Democrats mostly opposed to it.88 
Republican proponents defended the amendment as a pro-democracy 
measure, claiming that the two term limit 
"would strengthen and safeguard democracy from what they believed 
to be its greatest danger: the aggrandizement, consolidation, and even 
usurpation of political power by the executive branch of government." 
For them, "the Twenty-Second Amendment was not an undemocratic 
restraint upon the popular will, but a democratic restraint upon any 
future, dangerously ambitious demagogue."89 
Democratic opponents of the measure claimed that '"real democracy 
in action' was for the people to have the privilege of choosing whom they 
85. Katharine Q. Seelye, Term-Limits Advocates Take a Bad Thrashing, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 21, 1998, at A14 [hereinafter Seelye, Term-Limits Advocates]; see also 
Katharine Q. Seelye, Term Limits: Change Nobody Wants, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1995, 
at A28;. 
86. AI Kamen, Sunday in the Loop, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1998, at W6; 
Seelye, Term-Limits Advocates, supra note 85, at A14. 
87. Stephen W. Stathis, The Twenty-Second Amendment: A Practical Remedy 
or Partisan Maneuver? 7 CONST. COMMENT. 61, 69-70 (1990). 
88. !d. 
89. !d. (quoting ALAN P. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO 
THE CONSTITUTION 122 (1978)). 
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please as President," that to prohibit the reelection of "an experienced and 
popular President in a time of extreme national emergency" would invite 
dictatorships, and that, ultimately, the amendment was a thinly veiled 
attempt to attack the legacy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who had died in 
1945, shortly after being elected for a fourth term.90 
Whether the Twenty-Second Amendment furthered or undermined 
democratic values, there is little doubt that Republicans pursued this 
constitutional reform for partisan reasons. In both 1940 and 1944, the 
Republican Party platform (in an effort to derail Roosevelt's re-election 
bids) called for constitutional amendments to limit the president to two 
terms.91 Campaign literature in 1940, for example, "railed against the 
dangers of allowing a President to serve as a would-be dictator and made 
thinly veiled comparisons between Roosevelt and the Axis powers 
leaders."92 And when Republicans took over Congress in 1946 (the first 
Republican Congress since Hoover), they saw passage of the Twenty-
Second Amendment as an excellent vehicle to both increase the power of 
the Republican Congress and to discredit the policies of Roosevelt and 
then-president Harry Truman.93 
When the Twenty-Second Amendment was sent to the states for 
ratification, the presidential tenure issue held little interest for voters and 
the press. "There was only spotty coverage in the local press, virtually 
none in national periodicals, and little public participation. Even interest 
groups most directly affected by the change in presidential tenure paid 
little attention to the ratification process."94 This lack of interest is to be 
expected. Without knowing who sits in the White House and in Congress, 
voters and interest groups could not predict whether the Twenty-Second 
90. GRIMES, supra note 89, at 122; see also John D. Morris, Limit of Two 
Terms for Any President Approved by House, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1947, at 1; Richard L. 
Strout, The 22d Amendment: A Second Look, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 28, 1957, at 5. 
91. Republican Platform for 1940, in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 389, 394 
(Kirk H. Porter & Donald Bruce Johnson eds., 1956); Republican Platform for 1944, in 
NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 407, 412 (Kirk H. Porter & Donald Bruce Johnson eds., 
1956). 
92. Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The Twice and Future President: 
Constitutional Interstices and the Twenty-Second Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 565, 
586 (1999). 
93. See Strout, supra note 90, at 5. Not surprisingly, all Republicans voted for 
the amendment. Southern Democrats who disapproved of some of the policies of 
Roosevelt and Truman also voted for the amendment, giving it the two-thirds majority 
necessary for it to be sent to the states. Stathis, supra note 87, at 67. 
94. Stathis, supra note 87, at 71. 
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Amendment would prove useful or harmful to their favored policies.95 In 
contrast, during the 1940 election campaign, there was widespread public 
interest in the third term issue. That concern was "tied to the outcome of 
the election rather than any fundamental principle."96 Stated differently, 
voters will pay scant attention to structural reform proposals unless those 
proposals are directly linked to policy questions that they care about. 
Voter ignorance and apathy is a problem that limits democratic 
discourse about structural reform proposals. Unless first-order policy 
priorities are clearly in view, most voters will largely tune out. Thus, 
interest groups and politicians can advance their own agendas without 
substantial ballot box checks. More generally, as this Part has shown, there 
is a significant gap between rhetoric and reality in structural reform 
proposals, especially supposed pro-democracy reforms. In particular, 
elected officials and interest groups may pursue pro-democracy reforms 
that are smokescreens for the pursuit of substantive policy goals. These 
reforms may, ultimately, do little to advance their pro-democracy 
objectives. Instead, by capitalizing on political ignorance, lawmakers and 
special interests may see pro-democracy rhetoric as a convenient way to 
pursue partisan priorities. 
IV. POLITICAL IGNORANCE AND THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 
The problem of political ignorance impacts not only the goals of 
constitutional change, but also the process by which those objectives can be 
achieved. Political ignorance has three major implications for the process 
of constitutional change. First, it is likely to reduce the average quality of 
the changes enacted. Second, it will probably exacerbate the negative 
consequences of the crisis atmosphere from which large-scale constitutional 
change is likely to arise. Finally, the problem of political ignorance is an 
important, though far from decisive, consideration counseling against 
bypassing the amendment procedures of Article V of the Constitution. 
95. For similar reasons, there is no federalism constituency in Congress. See 
Devins, supra note 74, at 1058 (linking the absence of federalism-based interest groups 
to the fact that interest groups cannot predict whether a broad or narrow view of 
federalism will serve first-order policy preferences). 
96. Paul B. Davis, Presidential Tenure: A Review and Reappraisal 147 
(1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation). 
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A. Reducing the Quality of Constitutional Change 
Political ignorance and irrationality could easily reduce the quality of 
constitutional change. The most obvious scenario for this to happen is that 
ignorant voters might simply allow a flawed constitutional change to slip by 
without noticing. While this possibility may seem far-fetched in the case of 
constitutional changes that affect important issues, it is not completely 
implausible. After all, nearly seventy percent of the public was unaware of 
the passage of the 2003 prescription drug bill, which created the biggest 
new government program in almost forty years.97 It is potentially possible 
that the same could happen with a flawed constitutional amendment. 
Some of the more technical issues raised by constitutional reformers 
could potentially be vulnerable to this kind of near-total ignorance. For 
example, efforts to change the electoral rules by which members of 
Congress are selected, to abolish life tenure for federal judges, and to 
revise Article V itself are unlikely to engage widespread public attention 
because of their unexciting nature and the difficulty of connecting them to 
policy outcomes.98 For this very reason, the ratification of the Twenty-
Second Amendment went largely unnoticed by the general public. 
According to The Nation, the Amendment "glided through legislatures in a 
fog of silence-passed by men whose election in no way involved their 
stand on the question-without hearings, without publicity, without any of 
that popular participation that should have accompanied a change in the 
organic law of the country."99 Likewise, the press, the public, and interest 
groups were equally lax, with next to no press coverage, little public 
participation, and limited interest group involvement.100 
The public's lack of awareness of a constitutional change reduces the 
chance that the amendment process will be under any meaningful 
democratic control. This thereby increases the likelihood that changes will 
97. Somin, Ignorance Isn't Bliss, supra note 20, at 5-6. 
98. Sanford Levinson urges reform of all these areas in Our Undemocratic 
Constitution. For this very reason, Cass Sunstein and (to a lesser extent) Mark Tushnet 
have criticized Levinson for not taking into account the realities of a populist 
constitutional convention. Specifically, Sunstein and Tushnet both argue that a 
populist convention might not focus on the types of structural changes that Levinson 
embraces but, instead, might veer towards controversial social policy issues. See Cass 
R. Sunstein, It Could Be Worse, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 16, 2006, at 32; Mark 
Tushnet, The Politics of Levinson's Constitutional Convention, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y 
REV. (Online) (Dec. 4, 2006), http://www.hlpronline.com/2006/ll/tushnet_Ol.html. 
99. The Two- Term Limit, THE NATION, Mar. 10, 1951, at 216, 217. 
100. Stathis, supra note 87, at 71. 
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be made that benefit narrow interest groups at the expense of the general 
public. Unfortunately, most proposed reforms that seek to make the 
Constitution more democratic are difficult for the public to connect to 
important policy outcomes, and thus unlikely to attract a high degree of 
public attention. 
A more likely scenario than total ignorance by the majority of the 
public is a combination of ignorance about the details of proposed changes 
and rational irrationality in gauging their likely effects. Rationally ignorant 
voters might lack the detailed knowledge needed to accurately gauge the 
impact of proposed constitutional reforms, and instead assess them on the 
basis of heuristics that cater to preexisting prejudices or other irrational 
impulses.101 This may have happened in the case of the enactment of the 
Eighteenth Amendment, which voters may have supported as a result of 
general hostility to alcohol consumption without giving much consideration 
to the dangerous indirect effects of prohibition.102 
Finally, public ignorance makes voters more vulnerable to elite 
manipulation. If voters do not understand the details of proposed 
constitutional revisions or their likely effects, political elites may be able to 
manipulate those voters into supporting reforms that benefit organized 
interest groups at the expense of the general public.103 
Some of the major policies enacted as a result of the New Deal 
constitutional revolution likely took this form. For example, the National 
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA), the most far-reaching new 
legislation enacted during the New Deal, established a system of price and 
wage-fixing cartels that covered "almost the entire private, nonagricultural 
economy."104 As standard economic theory would predict, the cartels had 
101. For a discussion of "rational irrationality" see supra Part II.B. 
102. See MARK THORNTON, THE ECONOMICS OF PROHIBITION 89-138 (1991) 
(summarizing evidence that alcohol prohibition led to increases in crime and police 
corruption, and to the substitution of more dangerous drugs for alcohol by consumers). 
For the politics of the Eighteenth Amendment, see RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE 
EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT (1995). 
103. Our position does not rely on the possibly controversial claim that the 
most ignorant voters are necessarily the most manipulable. Some research suggests 
that voters with middle-range knowledge (which is still very low in an absolute sense) 
are more responsive to elite cues (and thus are potentially more manipulable) than 
those with the very lowest knowledge levels. See JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND 
ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 127-28 {1992) (providing evidence that "moderately aware 
conservatives and centrists" are more susceptible to changing their attitudes based on a 
liberal message than their lower knowledge-level counterparts). 
104. MICHAEL M. WEINSTEIN, RECOVERY AND REDISTRIBUTION UNDER THE 
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the effect of raising prices and increasing unemployment at a time when the 
economy was already reeling from the effects of the Great Depression. 105 
The enactment of the NIRA may have caused the United States's already 
shrunken GDP to constrict by another six to eleven percent.106 However, 
the NIRA probably did benefit labor union and industry cartel members 
who sought to eliminate competition from lower-cost competitors- a 
principal reason for the support NIRA attracted from key corporate and 
labor movement elites.l07 
Despite these traumatic and partly foreseeable results,108 New Deal 
era voters failed to understand the true impact of the NIRA. The 
Roosevelt Administration and other NIRA supporters likely exploited 
political ignorance in their efforts to win public support for the legislation 
and downplayed its departure from preexisting constitutional norms, which 
denied Congress the power to engage in such far-reaching regulation.109 
Such problems could arise with constitutional changes intended to 
promote democracy, as well as those enacted in pursuit of other objectives. 
Consider, for example, voter initiative :l.nd referendum. Although 
initiatives and referenda are intended to empower voters, interest groups 
and elites often manipulate this process, arguably preventing any increase 
in democratic control.110 The nature and degree of the risk of manipulation 
will vary from case to case. But any effort to make the Constitution more 
democratic must take due account of this risk. 
NIRA 1 (1980). 
105. ld. at 146-47. 
106. Id. at 146. 
107. See Somin, Voter Knowledge, supra note 2, at 651 n.183 (citing relevant 
literature). 
108. For example, black leaders understood that the NIRA would increase 
unemployment for poor black workers. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE 
OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM 
RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 88-89, 92-93 (2001); see also H.C.W., Book 
Note, The National Industrial Recovery Act, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 1092, 1092 (1933) 
(noting absence of strong opposition to the NIRA). By 1935, however, the NIRA had 
become more unpopular and Congress did not renew its two year charter. See Barry 
Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup: Public Opinion and Constitutional Change in 
the 1930s, 50 BUFF. L. REv. 7, 33-34 (2002) (noting contradictory poll results on the 
popularity of the NIRA between 1935 and 1939). 
109. Somin, Voter Knowledge, supra note 2, at 649-54. 
110. See discussion supra Part IlL 
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B. Political Ignorance and Constitutional Change in a Crisis Atmosphere 
Students of constitutional evolution have long recognized that large-
scale change is most likely to occur as a response to a major crisis.111 The 
three most important periods of constitutional change in American 
history-the Founding Era, the post-Civil War period, and the New Deal-
all probably would not have happened in the absence of crisis. Modern 
proponents of constitutional reform recognize that their proposals are most 
likely to be seriously considered in the event of a crisis such as a war or 
economic depression.''2 
Unfortunately, a crisis atmosphere could easily exacerbate the 
dangers of political ignorance. In the midst of a crisis, voters could easily 
neglect or lose sight of the long-term effects of constitutional change as a 
result of focusing on the immediate crisis at hand. Critics of the Bush 
Administration's policies in the War on Terror fear that this is happening 
as a result of overreaction to the immediate threat posed by terrorism.113 
Rationally ignorant voters who lack the knowledge necessary to weigh 
long-term impacts are more likely to fall prey to this error than those with 
greater knowledge and sophistication. 
This dynamic may have occurred during the New Deal period, when 
the Roosevelt Administration succeed in pushing through constitutional 
changes that gave Congress virtually unlimited regulatory authority, 
despite the fact that-according to surveys-the majority of voters 
probably opposed this outcome.114 Although the majority of citizens 
opposed giving Congress virtually unlimited regulatory authority, this 
result occurred anyway, probably because voters focused on the immediate 
economic crisis and either were unaware of or did not consider the long-
111. See, e.g. , BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 
(1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS]; ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND 
LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 
(1987). 
112. See, e.g. , LAZARE, supra note 1, at 293-96. 
113. For general treatments of how civil liberties are curtailed during war time, 
see generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
WARTIME (1998); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS nMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 
FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004); Lee Epstein et 
al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War Cases, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2005). For a detailed account of the 2001 Patriot Act, highlighting 
how national securities concerns overwhelmed civil liberties interests, see Robert 
O 'Harrow, Jr., Six Weeks in Autumn, WASH. POST MAG., Oct. 27, 2002, at 6. 
114. Somin, Voter Knowledge, supra note 2, at 624-28. 
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term effects of the New Deal constitutional revolution.' 15 The very 
outcome that voters opposed occurred because most may not have realized 
that it had happened. 
Moreover, a crisis atmosphere may increase the danger that rational 
irrationality will lead citizens to endorse dubious and dangerous 
constitutional changes whose proponents effectively cater to prejudice and 
irrational thinking. The best known historical example is the success of the 
Nazis in winning public support for their ideas by focusing on the grave 
crises besetting the Weimar Republic.116 Nazi leader Adolf Hitler 
specifically emphasized the importance of exploiting voter ignorance and 
irrationality in order to get citizens to support the Nazi program. He 
stressed that "[t]he receptivity of the great masses is very limited, their 
intelligence is small, but their power of forgetting is enormous."117 As a 
result, effective "propaganda must follow a simple line" and must appeal to 
"emotion and feeling" instead of "sober reasoning."118 Some Germans 
voted for the Nazis because they were convinced of the validity of the Nazi 
program through this kind of simplistic propaganda. Others simply cast a 
"protest vote" against the Weimar Republic without giving much 
consideration to the likely effects of the Nazi program if the party came to 
power.ll9 
The Nazi case is an extreme example of the exploitation of popular 
political ignorance in a crisis atmosphere. In the United States, we are 
unlikely to enact a comparably disastrous policy agenda. Nonetheless, the 
combination of political ignorance and crisis could lead voters to approve 
dangerous constitutional innovations. Some scholars fear that this will 
happen as a result of the ongoing War on Terror, which might tempt voters 
to approve excessive restrictions on civilliberties.120 During the New Deal 
constitutional revolution, the disastrous NIRA was deceptively sold to the 
public as a temporary emergency measure intended to overcome the crisis 
of the Great Depression.121 
115. /d. 
116. See generally RICHARD J. EVANS, THE COMING OF THE THIRD REICH 
(2004). 
117. ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 180 (Ralph Manheim trans. , Houghton 
Mifflin 1999) (1925). 
118. /d. at 181, 183. 
119. Evans, supra note 116, at 447-60; see also RICHARD F. HAMILTON, WHO 
VOTED FOR HITLER? (1982). 
120. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING 
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2006). 
121. Somin, Vocer Knowledge, supra note 2, at 652-53. 
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These points are _more suggestive than definitive. Much scholarly 
labor remains to be done before we have anything approaching a complete 
understanding of the interaction between crisis atmospheres, political 
ignorance, and constitutional evolution. 122 Nonetheless, the dangers posed 
by this combination deserve careful consideration from those who seek to 
reform the Constitution to make it more democratic. 
C. A Limited Defense of Article lf123 
The dangers posed by political ignorance provide a partial 
justification for abjuring constitutional change that bypasses the 
supermajority mechanisms of Article V of the Constitution, which requires 
the support of two-thirds of both houses of Congress and three-fourths of 
state legislatures.124 Through much of American history, Article V has 
been reviled for allegedly undermining democracy by making 
constitutional change too difficult to enact.125 Current constitutional 
reformers have argued that Article V should be eliminated,l26 or at least 
not be considered the sole legitimate mode of constitutional change.127 
But the much-criticized supermajority requirements of Article V may 
help mitigate the angers of political ignorance. Although studies of voter 
knowledge have historically found that most of the public is severely 
122. But cf Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic 
Failure, 92 VA. L. REV. 1091 (2006) (arguing that governments are no more likely to 
enact harmful policies during a crisis than during ordinary times). Unfortunately, 
Vermeule's analysis does not consider the possible impact of political ignorance during 
an emergency. 
123. The argument of this section is adapted and revised from Somin, Voter 
Knowledge, supra note 2, at 667-69. 
124. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
125. See generally JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS 
IN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1992) (describing two centuries of criticism of 
Article V). 
126. See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee Is .. . Article V, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998); LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 159-66. 
127. This view has been repeatedly advanced by Bruce Ackerman and Akhil 
Amar. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) 
(hereinafter, ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]; AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR 
THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS (1998); 
Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989); 
Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside 
Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994); ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 
111. . 
2007] Can We Make the Constitution More Democratic? 999 
ignorant, 128 they have also found that an important minority of voters, 
ranging from five to perhaps as many as fiftee.n or twenty percent, is much 
better informed than the average citizen.129 Some evidence suggests that 
the most-educated and best-informed citizens are also less likely to fall 
victim to "rational irrationality. "13° 
By requiring a massive supermajority to enact constitutional change, 
Article V effectively prevents enactment of any amendment that fails to 
win the support of at least a high proportion of this informed minority. In 
turn, this makes it difficult to enact an amendment merely through the 
manipulation of voter ignorance. Even if only a small minority of voters is 
informed enough to see through the amendment's advocates' campaign of 
deception, that minority may well be large enough to block its 
enactment.131 
This consideration falls well short of proving that Article V is the 
ideal procedure for constitutional amendment. In some cases, the need for 
change may be so great that we would be justified in taking the risk of 
circumventing it. In reality, the problem of political ignorance is less a 
justification for Article V's specific procedures than a more general 
argument for requmng supermajority assent to constitutional change. 




See discussion supra Part II.B. 
See, e.g., W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE PARADOX OF MASS POLITICS 186 
130. See CAPLAN, supra note 19, at 7-14. 
131. Defenders of supermajority requirements advance a similar argument in 
explaining why these requirements "protect the interests of popular, rather than 
legislative, majorities and protect the exercise of individual rights." John 0. McGinnis 
& Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority 
Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 509 (1995). With reference to a 1995 
House rule requiring a three-fifths majority of those voting to pass an increase in 
income tax rates, the need to persuade wavering lawmakers about the bill's merits (and 
the concomitant need to win the backing of three-fifths of lawmakers) would ensure 
that tax increases be enacted for the public interest and not special interests. Critics of 
such supermajority requirements, in contrast, see such demands as little more than a 
smoke screen to secure a favored policy agenda. See An Open Letter to Congressman 
Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539, 1542 (1995) (arguing that the three-fifths rule was 
"based upon substantive and selective judgments that income tax increases-and only 
these increases-are unwise and should not be encouraged"). For additional 
discussion, see supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (discussing the need for a 
super-majority of Senators to overcome the filibuster of judicial nominations) and 
supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text (discussing the gap between the rhetoric of 
the Contract with America and the reality of the 1995 Republican Congress's 
commitment to structural reforms, such as the three-fifths rule). 
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circumventing Article V should consider.132 
V. CONCLUSION 
Advocates of efforts to reform the Constitution to make it more 
democratic should make clear exactly what kind of democracy they have in 
mind. The answer to this oft-neglected question is crucial. Reform efforts 
should also give serious consideration to the reality of widespread political 
ignorance and irrationality. These forces both limit the effectiveness of 
proposed reforms and affect the process by which constitutional change is 
enacted. 
It is certainly possible that the Constitution can and should be 
reformed to make it more democratic. By no means do we rule out such a 
possibility. But it is difficult to promote beneficial reforms without a more 
realistic assessment of both their goals and the methods by which they are 
to be achieved. 
132. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 167-78 (arguing for enacting change 
through a constitutional convention). 
DISCUSSION 
PROFESSOR LEVINSON: The natural born citizen clause, which 
most of the time is interesting only to academics, in fact may very well 
explain our particular politics right now because does anyone have any 
serious doubt that Arnold Schwarzenegger would be a very considerable 
candidate either as a Republican or an independent? Were it not for the 
fact that, from my perspective, he is non-supportive, I do think that it is 
unjustifiable that he is prevented from running because of what I do think 
this is the second-class citizenship clause. It is the only thing I can think of 
off hand where the clause really has some bite. And in the book I am 
actually very critical of congressional Democrats who did not support 
Orrin Hatch's proposal seven years ago to eliminate this particular clause, 
and it may well be that one of the sources of lack of enthusiasm of getting 
along because it would seem to me that in what I would like to think of as 
the principles of the Democratic party to be impossible to defend this 
clause, I assume that part of the calculation is that it would help out 
Governor Schwarzenegger. 
Two other quick points-! disagree with you that the last period of 
substantial extra-Constitution change was the New Deal. I think that what 
we are going through right now is a deep and fundamental debate about 
the extent of non-Article V constitutional change with regard to the powers 
of the presidency, that the claims made by the Bush administration to some 
of us are well beyond what the constitution would sustain, but then of 
course so are claims about the New Deal. There are some very, very able 
lawyers who are defending the Bush Administration on a common law 
basis in part, saying, "Look at this case, look at that case, look at the 
emergency we are in," and so the President can in fact do whatever he 
wants just as, I will accept for these purposes as a quick summary of the 
New Deal, the Congress can do whatever it wants. So it seems to me that 
this is an extraordinarily important debate. Even if you think that the 
President does not have quite the powers that the Bush Administration 
claims, it is still undoubtedly the case that we have seen significant breach 
of presidential powers, particularly with regard to war and military over the 
last twenty years, and I think this is of fundamental importance and a 
worthy successor to the New Deal as an example of non-Article V 
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amendment. The very last point is Ilya's argument is not that the citizenry 
is dumb or ignorant in the sense of educated. I do not know how we 
compare to Sweden, but among large countries we have to compare very 
well in terms of having a literate, educated citizenry citizenry. Ilya is really 
making it a common school that I tend to agree with, actually. That once 
the county is sufficiently large, then a very smart, rational person will not 
allocate his or her scarce time, money, and energy in ventures where 
there's really no particular reason to do it other than a kind of civic duty 
that you can easily free-load off the people who will get engaged. I think 
this is a very serious problem and in the fourteenth Federalist paper, 
Madison confronted the critics who said, "You cannot have a republican 
political order except in a small homogeneous country or state." This was 
David Hume and Montesque. The Federalist number fourteen is famous 
in part because Madison makes the argument first of all that states are 
going to be greater me·naces in individual liberty than would be a federal 
government because it is so much easier for factions to hatchet control of 
the states. But his other argument is you can have an extended republic, 
and he makes the argument, I will not rehearse it here. But Madison was 
writing at a time when the entire population of the then United States was 
about three million people. Most of them of course could not vote. You 
start off with women and certain slaves and in most states newly freed 
blacks, so you had a rather small electorate. Geographically we were from 
Maine to Georgia going down vertically and over to the east coast of the 
Mississippi going horizontally. Now we are a country of somewhere in the 
300 millions going up very rapidly to 400 million, we extend from Maine to 
Hawaii, and depending on your view of Puerto Rico, into the Caribbean. 
I really do think that a fundamental question, which I do not have the 
beginning of an answer for, is how one has a flourishing civic republic, what 
the constitution says in Article IV is a republican formed government, 
which I think does mean a participatory government of active citizens. 
How does that survive when most people rationally believe that, even 
putting aside questions of constitutional difficulty, even if we had a much 
more wonderful Constitution than we do, it still would not make sense for 
most people to spend their scarce time, mmiey, and energy being one of a 
million voters, or a million contributors. This was the fundraising week on 
public radio in Austin, and Ira Glass gave a wonderful, wonderful 
fundraising pitch and he said look, "You know and I know that KUT is 
going to go on whether or not you contribute so anybody who says, 'we are 
going to go off the air if you don't send us forty dollars,' they are lying to 
you. We will stay on the air even if you do not send in forty dollars. The 
reason you ought to contribute to KUT is because you benefit from what 
they are doing, and because you were told by your parents that you should 
2007] Our Undemocratic American Constitution: Discussion 1003 
be involved and that you should not take things you benefit from for free. 
But trust me, KUT will go on even if you do not contribute." And that is 
the real war, with all due respect, between the economists' perspective. 
Economists point out that it is irrational to contribute to public radio; my 
favorite example is that they point out that it is irrational to tip if you are 
never going to go back. If you are a regular you should tip, but if you are 
not a regular it is irrational to tip and to engage in all sorts of the amenities 
of civilized life. And I think that is a fundamental problem of politics. I do 
not have a good answer for it. 
PROFESSOR SOMIN: Very briefly, the first two points that Sandy 
made I mostly agree with. I definitely agree it would be good to get rid of 
the naturalized citizen provision. I would only note that the way it is 
played out is an example of my point about substance and that before there 
was a serious potential candidate who would be a naturalized citizen, there 
simply was not much incentive for people to invest in making that change 
because neither party saw a substantive benefit to themselves for making it. 
Now that there are those people who like Arnold Schwarzenegger, as 
Orrin Hatch does, they say, "yes let us push ahead with it," but by the same 
token those people who do not say ... 
PROFESSOR LEVINSON: Like John McCain. 
PROFESSOR SOMIN: Yeah like John McCain perhaps, if those 
people who do not, even if they at some level agree with the general 
principle behind the movement, they are going to be hesitant to support it. 
On the big question that Sandy raised, and I have also raised in my own 
work a lot, about this question of sort of rational ignorance and incentive 
to participate, I also agree with a lot of what he said. I agree that the 
amount of participation and knowledge is somewhat higher than sort of a 
pure adherence to rational choice theory by individuals who you would 
expect. However, it is still the case that there is far less contribution to this 
sort of public good causes, I mean public good in the economic sense of the 
term, than you would have absent the rational ignorance problems or other 
problems of contribution. And certainly in the area of political knowledge 
most people do in fact have very little political knowledge when you take 
into account that some people have reasons for acquiring knowledge other 
than the reason of becoming a good voter it is not clear that there is very 
much acquisition of knowledge that can be traced simply to people that 
desire to be a good voter as opposed to some people who are just 
interested in politics, much the way that I know a lot about baseball 
statistics because I love baseball and not because I feel like I can affect the 
outcome of baseball games. And so similarly there are also political fans 
and I am also a political fan as I am sure Sandy probably is. I do not think 
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there is a definitive answer to the problem, but I do sketch out a partial 
answer in some of my works which is that we should want more decisions 
to be made by the types of social institutions where you do not have 
rational ignorance; in other words, by civil society and market institutions 
than by institutions where we do have rational ignorance problems such as 
electoral systems. Now I do not think I can fully justify libertarianism by 
this, even though I am libertarian, I certainly do not claim that this 
consideration alone justifies it, but I would suggest that it is an important 
reason to move in a more libertarian direction. I should also note that this 
is my argument I am sharing and this argument will not be in the paper and 
I am not sure if Neil Devins fully agrees with it, but he, like David Mayhew, 
is more moderate than I am and also probably more moderate than Sandy. 
But I think it is an important point to consider that maybe one reason why 
we want a strong Constitution which limits the powers of government and 
is difficult to amend is so that we can have more decisions made by the 
types of institutions which do not give people incentives to be rationally 
ignorant about the things they are deciding about. 
PROFESSOR HOROWITZ: I just wanted to call attention to one 
big difference between the 1787 constitutional convention and the 
convention of 2010 or whatever the year. The 1787 constitutional 
convention preceded the emergence of political parties, and so while there 
were interests represented at the convention -commercial and agricultural, 
big states, small states, slave owning states, non-slave owning states-the 
interests were not party interests. The presence of partisan interests 
changes everything because it gives rise to partisan visibility of the likely 
effects of various provisions of the proposed constitution on the fortunes of 
the parties. Take for example how the President should be elected. My 
guess is if this played out according to what I think would be the scenario, 
there would be a conspiracy at the convention between representatives of 
the two major parties to keep third parties out. That is the one thing on 
which they would really agree. And so you would not get the runoff 
because the runoff gives a tremendous boost in power to the third party. 
Neither would you get the alternative vote, of which by the way, I am 
probably the leading American proponent. I like the alternative vote and I 
think it would be a very good way to elect the President. But, it would 
seem to be a way that third parties could have an influence on the outcome 
of that election. And there would be many other ways in which partisan 
visibility would play a role that it absolutely did not play in 1787, and could 
easily get factored into this contemplation. 
PROFESSOR LEVINSON: Well I think that is one of the virtues of 
convention by lottery. Even though people might bring into the 
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convention that they are Democrats or Republicans, the odds, I think, are 
overwhelmingly less partisan. 
PROFESSOR HOROWITZ: The parties would organize the 
members of the convention. 
PROFESSOR LEVINSON: Well, they will try, but you do not know. 
One of the big differences, of course, between 1787 and 2012, at the 
earliest, is that there was no transparency whatsoever in 1787, whereas it 
has to be preserved and of course I would regard this as a good thing that 
the convention be covered by C-SPAN and that there would be no 
possibility for the kind of private dealmaking that was made. One of the 
wackier features of the temporary administrative law in Iraq was one that, 
at least on the face of it, required transparency. That everything that 
negotiators were doing not only had to be done in public, but they also had 
to create feedback mechanisms in order to get responses from ordinary 
Iraqis. Now there are a lot of reasons that did not work out very well, but I 
think all of us agree that there never would have been a Constitution of 
1787 if the drafting conditions had required this sort of this sort of 
transparency. 
PROFESSOR SOMIN: Can I say one very brief comment on what 
Sandy said about Bush and his claims of executive power? I do agree that 
if those claims were fully vindicated and institutionalized it would be a 
significant constitutional revolution and I do not mean to deny that. All I 
am saying is that the New Deal is the last creative way a major structural 
change of this sort was successfully carried through. I think Bush may want 
such a thing, he has received considerable pushback from the courts and 
from Congress and other sources, and if possible, counterfactually, if he 
had been much more successful with the war in Iraq or some of his other 
initiatives, maybe he would have prevailed on these things. Right now, it 
does not look like he is going to, but there is a potential future issue here, 
which I set out as sort of a crisis atmosphere can lead towards sort of large 
changes where the long-term considerations are not factored in, and that is 
if you think about if there is another attack on the scale of 9/11 or even 
larger, and another more popular President, more popular than Bush is 
right now, in his office at that time, then you might see a significant 
expansion of executive power that could be made to stick in a way that 
Bush, I think, has not been able to fully institutionalize the sorts of powers 
that he has claimed. I think that by claiming virtually absolute power, he 
has perhaps even done himself political harm. He has raised people's 
hackles and he has in effect forced the Supreme Court into a position 
where the Supreme Court felt they had to slap him down, even though I 
think they would have probably preferred to temporize and not have a 
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direct confrontation with him. 
GOVERNOR VILSACK: It seems to me that in this discussion of 
political ignorance that you have made a pretty good case for maintaining 
small states starting the political and election process. Because ·if we move 
toward a national primary, which appears to be where we are headed, I 
think we would basically fall back into the same trap you alluded to in your 
presentation- that the larger the audience, the less significant your vote 
becomes, the less engaged you are, which is why in Iowa sometimes it is 
difficult for candidates to know the difference between reporters and 
citizens. They all bring note cards in and make notes. 
PROFESSOR SOMIN: I do not necessarily disagree. I do think 
maybe, and I have not thought this through completely, certainly not near 
as much as Governor Vilsack has probably thought about it. But, it may be 
that we should start out with small states or perhaps which small state is the 
one that does it should rotate rather than always being Iowa and New 
Hampshire. Maybe some year Vermont should do it, or Montana, or 
Alaska, but it may be desirable to start off with small states. 
PROFESSOR GERKEN: The thing that I have in reaction to your 
paper Ilya is that it is true the citizens are ignorant but they also use 
heuristics, so parties provide a pretty good proxy for figuring out what their 
interests are. Not perfect, but a rough proxy. So parties do the work and 
then you vote, and you know that when you vote Democrat, you are voting 
for a particular set of ideas, and same thing for Republicans. On the 
constitutional convention end, if we worry about parties being the proxy 
because they are self-interested, Sandy's idea, while seemingly nuts, has 
actually worked once. In British Columbia, and now maybe we can just say 
the Canadians are a different and better people than we are. But in British 
Columbia they had a citizen's commission that designed electoral reform, 
and the thing that was remarkable about it is that even though there was no 
education campaign-people knew nothing about why they were voting-
they saw the words "citizen commission," and fifty-seven percent of them 
voted for it. And you have to think that was a heuristic, the same heuristic 
we use when we say, "look if it was good enough for Iowa and New 
Hampshire then it looks like the candidate we want." These are the same 
people whom we admire and will use Iowa and New Hampshire as a 
heuristic for voting. Sandy's citizen commission strikes me as a pretty 
powerful heuristic and contra Don's instinct that the parties would 
organize it, citizens do not like parties; they hate them in fact, so when the 
parties tried to organize the citizen commissions of British Columbia, there 
was pushback. They were actually pushed away from that process so just 
to let you know, I hate to endorse such a Kumbaya proposal as Sandy's, 
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but I will just say that both on the sort of hardcore realists of using 
heuristics for constitutional conventions and on sort of the general worry 
about voter ignorance, I think that Sandy's commission is not a crazy idea. 
PROFESSOR LEVINSON: One quick further point about the 
parties, that one of the reasons that I actually think this is an appropriate 
time to generate the kind of discussion I am interested in, is precisely 
because the two parties are sufficiently divided in terms of electoral 
strength. That we are as close in the real world to being behind a veil of 
ignorance as we are likely to get, that is, we do not know who is going to be 
president in 2012, we might be able to predict, given the current political 
situation, what might happen in 2008, but I think it would be a fool's bet to 
say "oh yeah, I am confident this is the president in 2012. I am confident I 
know who is going to control Congress, I am confident in this, that and the 
other." So even if you have rabid partisans, if you invited Chuck Schumer 
and Newt Gingrich into a room and said look, we are not going to talk 
about affirmative action, guns, abortion-we are going to talk about 
whether the president should have a veto. I do not know what the 
Republican position is on whether the President should have veto power or 
a Democratic Party position, and going down the whole list of things that I 
am most interested in, I am a political partisan in a number of ways, but 
naively or not, I view the book as a non-partisan book because for the life 
of me, I cannot really figure out why conservatives should love the 
Electoral College in 2012 and liberals should not or vise versa. Why it is 
that liberals should think policy-based presidential vetoes are just terrific 
or conservatives should say, "oh no, we really think it is very important that 
Hillary Clinton have a policy-based veto but also have a policy based veto 
if she becomes President." I think this is the perfect time, so that even if 
political parties try to organize around some of these issues, I am not sure 
what it would lead to, but I also take a certain comfort, I think you are 
right that the people who would be selected by this wacky scheme that has 
worked in some countries, would look from a perspective of public interest 
because there is no partisan alternative. If you have a partisan alternative 
it would say how does this help my people so I know whether to go. But 
here who knows what's going to help the Republican Party or the 
Democratic Party, except with Don's point that you might want to suppress 
third parties which would be a real shame in my belief. But I wonder if 
most ordinary Americans share that view of the Democratic and 
Republican national chairs. 
PROFESSOR SOMIN: Just quickly two seconds on heuristics-! 
agree that heuristics can be useful, but there are two big problems. One is 
to use heuristics effectively you need some pre-existing base of knowledge, 
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which many people lack such as knowledge about the parties and how they 
operate. Second, heuristics may be more difficult to use with big long-term 
constitutional changes than with issues of ordinary politics because a big 
long-term structural change will have many more potential unforeseen and 
difficult to gauge consequences than simply an ordinary policy change, and 
so ignorance to heuristics may make it more difficult-to-use heuristics to 
overcome ignorance in that situation than in many other situations, 
although I also think it is tougher than a lot of scholars believe even in 
ordinary political situations. 
